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The Clinton Case: Materiality and the
"Exculpatory No" Bar to Prosecution?
Stephen Michael Everhart*
I.

Introduction

An FBI agent is investigating a charge that the President of the
United States obstructed justice by telling a named White House Intern,
who the President had sex with, not to talk about the affair with anyone.
The agent has a tape recording of a conversation between the intern and a
friend, where the intern admits to having sex with the President and
being told by him not to talk about the affair. The intern has given a
sworn statement to the agent stating that she had sex with the President
and that he told her to be quiet about the matter. The intern has also
given the agent gifts she received from the President, clothing that
contains the President's DNA, and a tape recording of a telephone call
where the President is heard telling the intern to keep their liaison secret.
The agent closes her file and sends the file and a memo to the
Justice Department, recommending prosecution of the President for
obstruction. The agent knows the President has falsely denied other
sexual dalliances in the past and that he will probably deny this one if
asked. The agent also knows that it is a felony pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 10011 to lie to a government investigator.
The agent proceeds to the White House and interrogates the Chief
Executive in the Oval Office. The agent asks the President point blank,
"Did you have sex with the intern?" The President answers, "No." The
agent then asks, "Did you tell the named intern not to talk to anyone
about the affair?" The President responds, "No." The agent terminates
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; A.B., Florida State
University, 1968; J.D., University of Florida, 1971. The research for this Article was
funded by Stetson University College of Law, and the author is very grateful for that
assistance. The author wishes to thank Stetson Law Professor Michael Finch, University
of Florida Law Professor Emeritus Gerald T. Bennett, and Florida State University Law
Professor John F. Yetter for their reading of earlier drafts. The author also wishes to
thank Mark Chancey for his research assistance and Sharon Gisclair for her final review.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996).
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the interview.
Later, before a federal grand jury, the President not only admits to
having had sex with the intern, but also admits to having told the intern
not to talk to anyone about the affair. Can the now former President be
prosecuted, pursuant to § 1001 (a federal statute2 that prohibits lying to a
government agent), for lying to the investigator?
Section 1001 is a very broad statute, 3 and for forty-three years
courts and commentators worried about the scope of this statute as
applied to false denials of guilt. 4 Some courts believed that because the
purpose of § 1001 was to prevent people from obstructing, impairing, or
perverting governmental investigations, and because trained investigators
expect false denials of guilt by suspects, such falsehoods are incapable of
impairing or perverting a government investigation.5 These courts
2. This hypothetical is suggested by the apparently contradictory comments of
Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg (both members of the 5-4 majority) in Brogan v.
United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
Justice Scalia, in Brogan, said, "We cannot imagine how it could be true that
falsely denying guilt in a Government investigation does not pervert a governmental
function." Id. at 402. Justice Ginsburg said, "That encompassing formulation (the broad
scope of Section 1001) arms Government agents with authority not simply to apprehend
lawbreakers, but to generate felonies, crimes of a kind that only a Government officer
could prompt." Id. at 410.
Justice Ginsburg cited a 1977 law review article to flush out her concerns more
fully. Id. at 409 n. 1 (citing Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal
False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 316, 325-26 (1977) ("Since agents may often
expect a suspect to respond falsely to their questions, the statute is a powerful instrument
with which to trap a potential defendant. Investigators need only informally approach the
suspect and elicit a false reply and they are assured of a conviction with a harsh penalty
even if they are unable to prove the underlying substantive crime.")).
3. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
4. The doctrine was first articulated in 1955 by Judge Chestnut in United States v.
Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
5. For example, in United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 1988),
Cogdell, the defendant, denied her criminal involvement in the cashing of an IRS refund
check. The court, upholding the "exculpatory no" doctrine, said that Cogdell's
statements "also meet the requirement that they not pervert an agency's basic functions."
Id.
A trained agent cannot be overly surprised when a suspected criminal fails to
admit his guilt. "We presume that a thorough agent would continue vigorous
investigation of all leads until he personally is satisfied he has obtained the
truth. A false denial of guilt does not pervert the investigator's basic function
in the manner the statute was intended to combat, but is merely one of the
ordinary obstacles confronted in a criminal investigation."
Id. (citing United States v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (1986)). The Cogdell
court made it clear what kinds of statements were capable of perverting an investigation.
Id. at 184 n.6 (quoting United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972)
("Typical of the kind of statements that are within the purview of section 1001 are false
reports of crime made to federal law enforcement agencies that may engender groundless
federal investigations.")). Even Justice Scalia in Brogan used the perversion terminology
in rendering his decision on "exculpatory no." See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402.

2004]

THE CLINTON CASE

crafted an exception to liability under § 1001 for defendants who simply
make false denials of guilt to federal investigators. 6 This defense was
known as "exculpatory no."7
In Brogan v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the
"exculpatory no" defense. 8 The Court, dealing with the 1988 version of
§ 1001, concluded that § 1001 means what it literally says. 9 The statute
contains no exceptions to liability; therefore, there is no "exculpatory no"
exception to § 1001 liability.' 0 Even if someone simply falsely denies
his guilt to a government agent, he can be prosecuted."
Although Brogan may have killed the "exculpatory no" defense,
congressional amendments of § 1001 passed in 1996 may have
resurrected the defense. 12 In 1996, Congress amended the false

6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7. The defense had been accepted by seven circuits. See, e.g., Moser v. United
States, 18 F.3d 469, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The 'exculpatory no' doctrine represents a
judicial gloss on 18 U.S.C. § 1001 ....In a very narrow and limited fashion, it has found
favor here. It therefore becomes our obligation to examine this record under the concept
of 'exculpatory no' which has evolved in this circuit." (citations omitted)); United States
v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1990) ("An examination of these cases persuades
us as well that we should apply the 'exculpatory no' doctrine to this case."); Cogdell, 844
F.2d at 182 ("We agree with Cogdell's contention that her conviction under Section 1001
of making false statements to the investigating agent cannot stand. We conclude,
applying the 'exculpatory no' doctrine, that Cogdell's statements did not violate section
1001."); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The
,exculpatory no' doctrine provides an exception to § 1001 ....In Medina De Perez,
combining elements drawn from Bedore and Rose, we discussed five factors that should
be satisfied to apply the 'exculpatory no' doctrine ....
" (citations omitted)); United
States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 719 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Here as in Bush and Patersnostro,
the agent, acting in a police role, aggressively sought a statement from a person under
suspicion and not warned. The answer was essentially an 'exculpatory no' as to possible
criminal activity. All of the bases for the exception to § 1001 apply here."); United States
v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. London, 550
F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We have held, in enunciating the so-called 'exculpatory-no'
doctrine, that essentially negative answers to questions propounded by investigating
government officials are not statements within the meaning of the second clause of
§ 1001 in the absence of some affirmative, aggressive, or overt falsehood on the
defendant's part.")); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975)
(discussing the defense for the first time, but not calling it the "exculpatory no" defense).
The defense had been rejected by two circuits. See United States v. RodriquezRios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Finding no such reason to deviate from the
plain language of § 1001, we now discard the 'exculpatory no' doctrine in this circuit.");
see also United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Our flirtation with the
'exculpatory no' doctrine is over... and we therefore consider whether the doctrine is a
defense to Section 1001 liability in this circuit. We hold that it is not.").
8. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 398, 408.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996).
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statement of § 1001 and inserted the word "material."' 3
The
"materiality" requirement was not part of the 1988 statute when ruled
upon by the Court in Brogan.14 Under the common interpretation of
materiality, the government, in a § 1001 prosecution under the 1996
statute, now must prove that the lie was capable of affecting the agency's
determination. 15 This conception of materiality sounds like the old
perversion requirement of "exculpatory no," and may have resurrected
some of the pre-Brogan circuits' justification for the "exculpatory no"
defense.16
This Article explores the question of whether current § 1001's
requirement of materiality in the 1996 statute provides a defense akin to
the old "exculpatory no" defense. Part II chronicles the history of the
"exculpatory no" defense to § 1001 liability, which led to the decision in
Brogan. Part III discusses Brogan and how statements in that decision
seem to conflict with the position that materiality resurrects "exculpatory
no." Part IV discusses the concept of materiality as construed generally
in pre-Brogan caselaw and concludes that materiality does not resurrect
the old defense of "exculpatory no." Part V discusses the defense of
entrapment, the dismissal of criminal cases on due process grounds when
the conduct of the government is outrageous, and the dismissal of
prosecutions on other constitutional grounds. Part V concludes that there
are some protections for potential defendants like the President in our
hypothetical.
II.

"Exculpatory No"

Section 1001 began as a Civil War enactment, and it was originally
intended to prevent practices that would pervert the legitimate functions
of government. 17 Prior to the amendment of the statute in 1996, § 1001,
enacted in 1988, provided:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact,
or makes any false statements or representations, or makes or uses
13. Id. The second clause (the false statement clause) of § 1001 now reads: "(2)
makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation ....
" Id.
14. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 398-408.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Statements
are material within the meaning of § 1001 when they have the natural tendency or
capacity to deceive, affect, or influence the federal agency.").
16. See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
17. See United States v. Rodriquez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1994)
(referring to the Act of March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863)) ("It is said that the
purpose of § 1001 is to protect the government from practices that would pervert its
legitimate functions.").
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any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not8 more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.1
The second clause of § 1001 in the 1988 statute purports to
criminalize false statements made to government investigators. 19 This
clause appears to be clear. It would seem to criminalize any and all false
statements, and contains no exceptions, least of all for false denials of
guilt. To convict someone for making a false statement to a government
investigator under the 1988 § 1001 statute, the government had to prove
that the defendant (1) knowingly, (2) made a statement, (3) in relation to
a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United
States, (4) with knowledge that it was false. 20 A plain reading of that
statute and caselaw, therefore, would appear to impose liability upon the
President for his false denials to the FBI agent. But seven circuits had
adopted the "exculpatory no" exception to liability under § 1001 of the
1988 statute. 2' This exception was a "judicial gloss" '22 on § 1001 of the
1988 statute, which holds that under some circumstances the government
may not prosecute an individual for false statements made while
responding to questioning by a government investigator where a truthful
statement would have incriminated the defendant.23 In our hypothetical,
a truthful response by the President about instructing the intern to remain
silent would have incriminated the President on the obstruction charge.
The circuits that adopted "exculpatory no" gave several
justifications for the doctrine. There was a concern that it was unfair to
prosecute someone for an oral, unsworn, false statement under § 1001 of
the 1988 statute, when an oath, and sometimes a writing, is required in
perjury prosecutions. 24 There was also a concern that the witness in the
§ 1001 investigation should be warned that lying to the investigator was
a crime,25 and that a broad interpretation of § 1001 in the 1988 statute
18.
19.

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.

20.

See United States v. Weiner, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) ("To convict a

defendant of violating Section 1001, the government must prove that the defendant: (i)
knowingly and willfully, (ii) made a statement, (iii) in relation to a matter within the
jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States, (iv) with knowledge that it
was false or fictitious and fraudulent.").
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

23.

See supra notes 5, 7, 15, and accompanying text.

24.

See, e.g., United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975) ("The

defendant here did not initiate anything; he did not even go so far as to fabricate a
misleading story in response to the inquiries. He merely gave negative, oral responses to
the questioning. No oath was given; no transcript taken. The interviews were
informal.").
25. See, e.g., Giles A. Birch, Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents:
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would swallow up the perjury statute and a plethora of other false
26
statement statutes that apply to telling lies to specific federal agencies.
There was also the issue that the most trivial and innocent statement
under the plain reading of the statute could result in a felony
conviction.27 But the two main rationales for the doctrine were that (1)
the broad application of § 1001 in the 1988 statute to exculpatory denials
comes "uncomfortably close" to infringing on Fifth Amendment rights
28
against compulsory self-incrimination, and (2) a false denial of guilt did
not perpetrate a fraud upon the government because trained investigators
expect suspects to lie, and hence lying defendants do not obstruct or
pervert the functioning of government. 9
Applying just the perversion rationale to our hypothetical, how
could the President's lies obstruct the government's investigation? After
all, suspects, even Presidential suspects, are expected to deny their guilt
to law enforcement. The agent in the hypothetical knew of other cases
where the President initially denied a sexual liaison, but later was forced
to admit the truth. She expected the President to lie. If so, how is the
agent's investigation in this case obstructed? What she got was what a
trained investigator should have expected, and hence the President
should be protected by "exculpatory no" from prosecution under § 1001.
But there was conflict in the circuits over "exculpatory no" in the
1988 statute. Two circuits, the Fifth30 and the Second, 31 rejected
"exculpatory no," finding no need to deviate from the plain reading of
Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273, 1288 (1990) ("[T]he
statute should be presumed not to apply unless the agent has warned the suspect that
lying is a crime and that silence is permitted.").
26. See, e.g., United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (1972) ("If the italicized
portion of section 1001 were read literally, virtually any false statement, sworn or
unsworn, written or oral, made to a government employee could be penalized as a felony.
Thus read, section 1001 would swallow up perjury statutes and a plethora of other federal
statutes proscribing the making of false representations in respect of specific
agencies ...").
27. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 470 F.2d 354, 358 (1972) ("It is noted that
we are dealing with a very broad statute. Were it to be applied in every situation
consonant with its literal wording any individual who passed on to a governmental
agency the most trivial bit of misinformation would be criminally liable for his
statement.").
28. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Courts also
have recognized an additional justification for the doctrine as a safeguard against
applications of section 1001 that are 'uncomfortably close to [violating] the Fifth
Amendment."'); see also United States v. Rodriquez-Rios, 991 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.
1993) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) ("We found further justification for the doctrine in
a perception that a broad application of the statute came 'uncomfortably close' to
infringing upon Fifth Amendment rights.").
29. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
30. See Rodriquez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1045.
31. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996).
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§ 1001 in the 1988 statute. Under this rationale, the President has no
defense and can be prosecuted for the 1988 § 1001 violation. It took the
Court forty-three years, 32 but they supposedly resolved the conflict over
"exculpatory no" when they decided Brogan in January of 1998.
III.

Brogan v. United States

In Brogan, IRS agents questioned the defendant in his home.33 The
agents were investigating whether the defendant, as a union officer,
received any cash or gifts from a corporation whose employees were
34
represented by defendant's union.34 The defendant's
response was no. 35
The agents then told the defendant that a search of the corporation's
records showed that the defendant had received cash or gifts from the
corporation. 36 The defendant was indicted for accepting unlawful cash
payments from an employer and was also charged with making a false
statement to a government agent in violation of § 1001.37
The defendant was convicted at trial and the Second Circuit
affirmed, rejecting the defendant's request that the Second Circuit adopt
the "exculpatory no" doctrine. 38 The Court granted certiorari, and Justice
Scalia delivered the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. 3 9 The Court
rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine and held that "any false
statement-that is, a false statement of whatever kind," is covered by the
1998 version of § 1001. 40 The Court rejected the assertion that false
denials of guilt do,not "pervert" governmental functions:
We cannot imagine how it could be true that falsely denying guilt in a
government investigation does not pervert a governmental function.
Certainly the investigation of wrongdoing is a proper governmental
function; and since it is the very purpose of an investigation to
uncover the truth, any falsehood relating to the subject of the
investigation perverts that function.41
Just as the plain reading of the 1988 version of § 1001 is clear (there
is no "exculpatory no" exception in the statute), Justice Scalia made

32. See Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 182 ("The ['exculpatory no'] doctrine was articulated
first by Judge Chesnut in United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).").
33. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 399 (1998).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 399-400.
37. Id. at 400.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. ("By its terms, 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 covers 'any' false statement-that is,
a false statement 'of whatever kind ... .
41. Id at 402.
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himself perfectly clear. Any false statement (at least under the 1988
version of § 1001) is actionable.42 But Justice Scalia went further and
said that even a disbelieved lie would be actionable under the 1988
version of § 1001.43

It could be argued, perhaps, that a disbelieved falsehood does not
pervert an investigation. But making the existence of this crime turn
upon the credulousness of the federal investigator (or the
persuasiveness of the liar) would be exceedingly strange ....

In any

event, we find no basis for the major premise that only those
falsehoods
that pervert governmental functions are covered by
44
§ 1001.

Under the reasoning of Brogan, it would appear that the falsehood
by the President in our hypothetical would be actionable under the old
version of § 1001, because the 1988 version of § 1001 covers "any
falsehood." But the version of § 1001 interpreted in Brogan, the 1988
version, differs from the 1996 version effective today. But is the
difference a material one? Can the 1996 amendment to § 1001 operate in
the nature of "exculpatory no" to save the President in our hypothetical?
IV. Materiality
Prior to 1996, there were many attempts by Congress to amend
§ 1001. Congress considered, for example, a bill requiring the false
statement to be in writing.4 5 A bill requiring the government investigator
42.
43.

See id.
See id.

44.

Id.

45. See United States v. Rodriquez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1048 n.19 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citing Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1742
(1980); Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343
(a)(1)(A) (1981)). In United States v. Poutre,the First Circuit stated:
As of the date of this opinion, versions of the long-awaited revision of the

federal criminal code have been favorably reported by the judiciary committees
of both houses of Congress (H.R. 6915, S.1722, 96th Congress., 2d Sess.).
Each version significantly narrows the scope of the existing false statements
provision while grading the offense less severely. The House provision,
Section 1742, covers only written or recorded statements, thereby avoiding the
dangers associated with the lack of a reliable transcript. The House bill reduces
most false statement offenses to misdemeanors, punishable by a maximum term
of imprisonment of twelve months as compared to five years under existing
law, and grades as a class E felony (eighteen months) false statements made in
an investigation by the Inspector General. The Senate version takes a different
approach, covering unrecorded oral statements, but requiring corroborating
evidence in such prosecutions. Section 1343(a)(1)(A), 1346(b)(4). The Senate
bill incorporates the "exculpatory-no" doctrine as a grading devise, classifying
such statements as class A misdemeanors (twelve months) and all other false
statements as class E felonies (two years).
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lying to a government investigator was a crime
to advise the suspect that
46
was also unsuccessful.

Prior to 1996, the word "materiality" did not appear in the false
statement clause of § 1001,47 and there was a conflict in the circuits over
whether materiality was implied in clause two (the false statement
clause).4 8 Some of the circuits considered materiality an essential
element of a § 1001 false statement prosecution, but one circuit did not.49
In order to resolve this conflict in the circuits, the false statement clause
of § 1001 was amended in 1996.50 The statute was amended to provide
liability only for those persons who make a "materially false, fictitious,
or fraudulent statement or representation." 5' Now, materiality is an
element of the offense; it is a matter for the jury,52 and the failure to
submit the materiality issue to the jury infringes on a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.53
Two arguments appear to support the position that the 1996 addition
of materiality to § 1001 resurrected the "exculpatory no" defense. First,
the definition of materiality sounds like the old justification for
"exculpatory no." The test for determining materiality under § 1001 is
generally stated to be "whether the false statement has the capability of
affecting or influencing the exercise of a government function, ' ,54 or
better stated, whether the false statement has the capacity "to impair or
pervert the functioning of a governmental agency. 55 This definition of
646 F.2d 685, 686 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980).
46. See Rodriquez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1048 n.19.
47. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Irvin, 654 F.2d 671, 682
(10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1979).
49. See Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 ("Most of the Courts of Appeal, with the exception of
the Second Circuit, have held that materiality is an essential element [of a prosecution
under § 1001].").
50. Restoration of False Statement Penalties, H.R. REP. No. 680, 104th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1996) ("This express requirement that all three offenses have materiality as an
element resolves a conflict among circuits as to whether materiality is an element of all
three offenses or merely the offense of falsifying ....).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
52. See Unites States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1474 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) ("It is uncontested that conviction under
[§ 1001] requires that the statements be 'material' to the Government inquiry, and that
'materiality' is an element of the offense that the Government must prove.")).
53. See United States v. Dedhia, 134 F.3d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) ("In Gaudin, an 18 U.S.C. § 1001
prosecution as well, the Court held that when materiality is an element in a charged
offense, a trial judge's refusal to submit that issue to the jury infringes on the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.")).
54. United States v. Herring, 916 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
55. United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469, 1473 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
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materiality sounds very much like the impairment and perversion factors
found in the old "exculpatory no" defense.56 If the two concepts are the
same, the President in our hypothetical has a new defense, akin to the old
"exculpatory no" doctrine.
The pre-Brogan courts, however, treated this perversion/impairment
factor differently than the Court did in Brogan. Where the pre-Brogan
courts presumed that a suspect's false denial of guilt did not have the
capacity to impair or pervert
the investigation of a good agent,57 Brogan
58
opposite.
the
presumed
Second, some pre-Brogan cases have stated that false "exculpatory
no's" may be immaterial.5 9 In United States v. Moore, the Fourth Circuit
implied that this might be the position of not only the Fourth, but of the
60
Sixth and Ninth Circuits as well.
Some courts have observed that under [the] reasoning [that a false
denial of guilt is merely one of the ordinary obstacles confronted in a
criminal investigation], false denials of guilt may be immaterial and
thus outside the scope of section 1001 regardless of the operation of
the "exculpatory no" doctrine. 6'
But this observation is based on the pre-Brogan premise that false
"exculpatory no's" do not pervert government investigations. As
indicated by Justice Scalia in Brogan, the majority of the Court rejects
this presumption.62
Despite the statutory definition of materiality or the pre-Brogan
courts that suggested false denials of guilt are not material, false denials
of guilt must be capable of perverting or obstructing a government
investigation to be material. How do false "exculpatory no's" obstruct or
pervert a government investigation? Justice Scalia cannot imagine how
they do not, but he gave no specific examples of how they do.
Fortunately, a few perjury and false statement cases do.
In United States v. Lee,63 a case predating the 1996 amendment of
§ 1001, the defendant was charged with perjury before a federal grand
jury. Materiality is an element in a perjury prosecution. 64 The grand jury
States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980)).
56. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
58. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400-02 (1998); see supra text
accompanying notes 40-44.
59. See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 979 (4th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 979 n.7 (citing United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1321 n.7 (6th Cir.
1991); United States v. Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 1989)).
61. Id.
62. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408.
63. 509 F.2d 645 (C.A.N.Y. 1975).
64. Id.at 647.
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in Lee was investigating payoffs made by gamblers to police officers.6 5
Lee, a police officer, denied that he picked up money from two
gamblers.6 6 Lee maintained that his lies were immaterial because the
grand jury already knew the truth (from the gamblers) before Lee
testified.6 7 Rejecting Lee's contention and finding his lies to be material,
the Second Circuit found that Lee had frustrated the grand jury probe,
because, had he told the truth, the grand jury may have found out about
other possible payments or gifts to Lee.6 8 In our hypothetical, if the
President had told the truth about having sex with the intern and telling
her not to talk about the affair, perhaps other questions from the agent
would have revealed other affairs, with other interns, and other
instructions to obstruct investigations.
In United States v. LeMaster,69 the defendant was interviewed by
the FBI as part of a corruption investigation.7 ° It was alleged that certain
legislators had been receiving money illegally from lobbyists in
exchange for votes on legislation. 71 LeMaster, a state legislator, was
asked by the FBI agents whether anyone had given him any cash while
he was on a certain trip to Miami. 72 The agents already knew the answer
to this question because they had recorded the cash-delivering
transaction between the defendant and the lobbyist informant.7 3
74
LeMaster simply said, "No," when asked if he had received any cash.
Finding LeMaster's lie to be material, the court said:
In light of Spurrier's [the informant-lobbyist] allegations that he gave
LeMaster cash in 1990, investigation of the entire relationship
between Spurrier and LeMaster was extremely material and a
necessary part of the FBI's obligation to seek out the truth .... If the
investigation had been terminated without interviewing LeMaster, it
would have left open the possibility that LeMaster had an innocent
explanation for having accepted the money from Spurrier. If such an
explanation was offered, the FBI had an obligation to investigate its
veracity. Alternatively, the absence of a satisfactory explanation
would have tended to corroborate Spurrier's allegations. Since
LeMaster's responses foreclosed this critical line of questioning, his
false statements were clearly material within the context of
65.

Id. at 646.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69.

54 F.3d 1224 (6th Cir. 1995).

70. Id. at 1226.
71. Id. at 1226-27.
72. Id. at 1229-30.
73. Id. at 1227.
74.

Id.
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The agent in our hypothetical, like the agents in LeMaster, already
knew what the answer to their questions would be. In our hypothetical,
as in LeMaster, the President may have had an "innocent" explanation.
Maybe he had sex with the intern and asked her not to talk about the
affair, but he never told her to lie about their affair. "Alternatively, the
absence of a satisfactory explanation [by the President] would have
tended to corroborate" the agent's other testimony and evidence.76 But
the President's false denials, like the false denials in LeMaster,
foreclosed this critical line of inquiry. Hence, the President's falsehoods,
like the falsehoods in LeMaster, are material.
One might assume that once the truth is known (as in our
hypothetical), there can be no perversion of a government function.
However, Lee and LeMaster disabuse us of that notion. In both cases,
the investigators already knew the truth, but the suspect's lies prevented
the government from making better cases or more cases against the
defendant, and in both Lee and LeMaster, the lies were still found to be
material and actionable.7 7
In our hypothetical, however, the obstruction investigation was over
when the President was interrogated by the FBI. The agent closes her
file and sends it to the Justice Department for prosecution. Then the FBI
agent goes to the White House to manufacture the § 1001 crime. She
asks two questions, gets an "exculpatory no" response to both, and thus
manufactures a violation of § 1001. Does the actionability of a § 1001
violation depend on the mens rea of the investigator? Yes. Because if
there is a bona fide investigation proceeding on some underlying crime,
and the investigators are building their case, the defendant's false
"exculpatory no" can impede and obstruct an investigation and hence it
will be found to be material. But if the investigator is interviewing the
defendant with the sole purpose of trapping him into committing a crime
(as in our hypothetical), the defendant has a defense to such a
prosecution, and a method to develop it. 78 The defense is not materiality,
however, but a defense based on the conduct of the FBI agent, the
supervisory power of the Court, and the Constitution.

75.
76.

Id. at 1230-31.
See id. at 1231.

77.

See id. at 1230; United States v. Lee, 509 F.2d 645, 647 (C.A.N.Y. 1975).

78. Discovering whether a law enforcement officer is conducting a bona fide
investigation or manufacturing a crime can and should be left to discovery and crossexamination in the trial of the § 1001 case, just as it is in all other criminal prosecutions.
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Protections for the President

The President has been accused of obstructing justice because he
told an intern he had sex with not to tell anyone about the affair. The
agent has completed her investigation. She has a tape recording between
the intern and a friend where the intern admits having sex with the
President and being told by him to not talk about the affair. The agent
has the intern's sworn affidavit admitting the same thing. She also has a
tape recording where the President is heard telling the intern to keep their
affair secret. The agent has completed her investigation. She has closed
her file and has sent it to the Justice Department for prosecution. Yet,
the agent is not through with the President. She knows it is a crime for a
citizen to lie to a government investigator; she also knows that the
President, if asked, will deny the affair because the President does not
know of the agent's evidence. So the agent goes to the President and
asks him two simple questions, which, as anticipated, he denies (after
being threatened with a grand jury appearance). This appears to be a
violation of § 1001. But is there any possible defense to the § 1001
charge for the President under our hypothetical based on the conduct of
the FBI agent? There is. But the defense is not based on materiality. It
is based on the law of entrapment and the Constitution of the United
States.
The defense of entrapment is a "judge-made" defense to a criminal
prosecution. 79 The defense was first enunciated by the Court in Sorrells
v. United States.80 As stated in Sorrells, the underlying philosophy of the
defense is that "[i]t is not [the] duty [of government] to ...create crime

for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it."' s But is that not
exactly what the FBI agent did in our hypothetical? Did she not create a
crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing the President?
The case against the President had already been sent over to the Justice
Department for prosecution. The agent knew it was a crime for people to
lie to her, and she also knew that the President would lie about the affair.
Was there a need to conduct further investigation by interviewing the
accused to locate additional admissible evidence to use in the prosecution
of the President? The agent already had an admissible non-hearsay
statement from the defendant admitting that he told the intern to keep
their affair secret. 82 The materiality cases 83 hold that materiality is not a
79. See United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The initial
Supreme Court decision projecting the defense of entrapment, a judge-made defense put
forward as implicit in the legislative definition of a crime, was Sorrells v. United
States....").
80. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
81. Id.at444.
82. For a thorough analysis of this principle, see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
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defense to a § 1001 violation when an agent builds her case against a
suspect by asking questions to which she already knows the answers.
But is entrapment a defense to a § 1001 violation when an agent is no
longer building her case, as in our hypothetical, but is attempting to pile
on additional charges against a suspect?
In deciding whether a suspect has been entrapped and is entitled to a
judgment of acquittal by the court as a matter of law because the
government has unlawfully created the crime or illegally induced the
criminal act or unlawfully instigated the offense, courts have devised
three tests.84 Each of the three tests looks at and weighs two factors: the
predisposition of the suspect to commit the act and the conduct of the
government in getting the suspect to commit the crime. 85 The first test,
the one adopted by the Supreme Court, is called the "subjective" or
"predisposition" test.86 Here, the Court only looks to see if the suspect
was predisposed to commit the crime.87 The burden of proof to establish
predisposition is on the prosecution,8 8 and although the process has been
C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.27, at 864-65 (2d ed. 1999). Mueller and Kirkpatrick
argue:
FRE 801(d)(2)(A) creates what amounts to an exception for statements by a
party when offered against him. The principle that the hearsay doctrine does
not protect one against use of his own statement is a logical expression of the
philosophy of the adversary system and is closely connected with the personal
freedom and responsibility that are part of life in a free society ....The
exception has almost infinite breadth: It makes no difference whether a
statement is written or spoken or in the form of nonverbal cues or word
substitutes (pointing or nodding) ....Statements qualify largely without regard
to surrounding circumstances, and the exception reaches statements to police,
testimony or pleas from other proceedings, recorded statements ....
Id.
83. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
84. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, § 19.01, at 471-84 (3d ed. 1993) for an excellent discussion of the
entrapment defense, the tests applied by the various courts, the various burdens of proof,
and a briefing of the leading cases.
85. Id.
86. See id. § 19.02 (c), at 474.
87. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976) ("We ruled out the
possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon governmental
misconduct in a case, such as this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to
commit the crime was established.").
88. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 5.3(d), at
285 (2d ed. 1992). LaFave and Israel state:
In those jurisdictions which follow the majority, subjective approach to
entrapment, it is generally accepted that the defendant has the burden of
establishing the fact of inducement by a government agent. The extent of this
burden is less than clear. Some courts require a defendant to sustain a burden
of persuasion by proving government inducement by a preponderance of the
evidence. Many courts, however, indicate that the defendant only has the
burden of production, which can be met by coming forward with "some
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criticized, the evidence usually consists of prior similar crimes
committed by the accused. 9 If, for example, the crime charged involves
an allegation that the defendant sold drugs to an undercover detective,
then the defendant's prior drug sales, whether such sales resulted in
conviction or not, will be proffered by the prosecution to show that the
idea to sell the drugs in this case was not put in the head of the defendant
by the police. 90 The police merely got a currently operating drug dealer
to make a sale to an undercover police officer. 9' With this evidence of
predisposition, the court will not find entrapment as a matter of law. The
defendant can still argue entrapment to the jury, but with evidence before
the court of the defendant's prior drug sales, an acquittal is unlikely. If
the court finds no evidence that the defendant was predisposed in a pretrial proceeding or at trial, the court will direct a verdict in favor of the
accused.92 In our hypothetical, the President has lied before about his
evidence" of government conduct which created a risk of persuading a nondisposed person to commit a crime. In any event, once the defendant's
threshold responsibility is satisfied, the burden is then on the government to
negate the defense by showing beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's
predisposition.
Id.
89. See id. § 5.3(a), at 283.
In most jurisdictions this means that once entrapment has been raised as a
defense, the usual evidentiary rules are no longer followed. For the purported
purpose of allowing the factfinder access to all information bearing upon the
predisposition issue, courts have allowed the receipt into evidence of
defendant's prior convictions, prior arrests, and information about his
"reputation" and even concerning "suspicious conduct" on his part. The result
is that other wise inadmissible hearsay, suspicion, and rumor is brought into the
case and the defendant, in effect, is put on trial for his past offenses and
character.
Id. In Hampton, Justice Powell stated:
The discussion of predisposition, for example, often seems to overlook the fact
that there may be widely varying degrees of criminal involvement. Taking the
narcotics traffic as an example, those who distribute narcotics-the
"pushers"-are the persons who, next to those who import or manufacture,
merit most the full sanction of the criminal law. Yet, the criminal involvement
of pushers varies widely. The hardcore professional, in the "business" on a
large scale and for years, is to be contrasted with the high-school youth whose
"pushing" is limited to a few of his classmates over a short span of time.
Predisposition could be proved against both types of offenders ....
425 U.S. at 495 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90.
91. See id.
92. For a more thorough discussion about what issues are triable by the court and
what issues are triable by the jury, and what issues can be decided by the court as a
matter of law relating to the entrapment defense, see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 88, §
5.3 (b), at 284, which states in part, "Traditionally, the entrapment defense has been
regarded as a matter for the jury rather than for determination by the judge. Even where
this is unquestionably the case, the judge may rule on the sufficiency of the proof to raise
the issue in the first place, and where uncontradicted evidence supports the conclusion
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sexual dalliances and, therefore, he is predisposed to lie about previous
sexual encounters; consequently, the President would not be entitled to a
judgment of acquittal based upon subjective entrapment. He could take
his case to the jury, but the court would offer no protection, either pretrial or at trial.
The second test for entrapment is known as the "objective" or
"conduct of the government" test.93 Under this test, which is not
followed by the Supreme Court94 but is applied by the majority of state
courts, 9 5 the focus is on the government agent and not on the
predisposition of the defendant. 96 Here, the court looks to see if the
actions of the agent (her inducements, threats, deceptions, etc.) were such
that even an innocent person would have succumbed and committed the
criminal act. 97 If so, then even if the accused has a prior record of
committing similar crimes, the defendant is entitled to a judgment of
acquittal by the court based on a finding of objective entrapment. 98 But
that is not the case in our hypothetical. No threats were issued to the
President. No promises or inducements were given to him in exchange
for his false denials of guilt, and a judgment of acquittal by the court on
the grounds of objective entrapment would be unavailable.
The third test for entrapment is known as the "hybrid" test. 99 This
test is a two-step process in which the court first looks to see if there is
improper conduct by the agent, and if not, then the court looks at the
predisposition of the accused. 0 0 The hybrid test is also unavailable to
the President in our hypothetical because the President meets the
predisposition prong and fails the conduct of the government standard.
Even though the court in our hypothetical is unlikely to dismiss the
prosecution of the President on entrapment grounds, there may be
another defense for the President. Unlike the entrapment defense, this
defense is based on the Constitution.

that the defendant was entrapped the issue may of course be decided as a matter of law by
the court." Id.
93. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 84, § 19.01.
94. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 88, § 5.2 (b), at 280 ("The subjective
approach to entrapment has been consistently affirmed by a majority of the Supreme
Court ...").
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 84, § 19.01, at 468 (citing Moore v.
State, 534 So.2d 557 (Miss. 1988)) ("Still other courts combine the two approaches,
looking first at whether the conduct of the authorities was improper and, if not, then
looking at whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime . .
100. Id.
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This defense, known as the "due process" defense,'' is grounded in
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 10 2 It focuses exclusively on the conduct of the government,
and can be found even if the defendant is predisposed to commit the
crime. 10 3 Like the objective prong of the entrapment defense, the court
only looks at the conduct of the government agent under the "due
process" test.1°4 If the agent's conduct was outrageous, the defendant is
entitled to a judgment of acquittal by the court. 0 5 If his conduct does not
rise to the level of outrageous conduct, the defendant is not entitled to a
judgment of acquittal. 10 6 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in the
entrapment case of Hampton v. United States, first suggested the
possibility of a due process dismissal of a case because of outrageous
police conduct. 10 7 Justice Powell stated: "Due process in essence means
fundamental fairness, and the Court's cases are replete with examples of
judgments as to when0 such
fairness has been denied an accused in light
8
of all circumstances.'1

In the circumstances of the hypothetical, the President may find
some protection in the words of Justice Powell. There was no need for
the agent in the hypothetical to interview the President. The case had
been fully investigated and sent to the Justice Department for
prosecution. The Department had not asked the agent to re-interview the
President. The agent had the President's statement on tape. There was
no point in interviewing the President. The agent did not ask questions
that sought to clarify some of the President's statements that were on the
tape. She simply asked the questions necessary to make a § 1001 case.
This may be outrageous conduct, but there have only been a few cases
upholding due process dismissals. However, those cases are not
analogous to our hypothetical, and the case Justice Powell cited for his
constitutional proposition,'0 9 if meant to be the benchmark for such
101. Id. § 19.02 (d), at 477 ("A Due Process Test?"); see also Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (Powell, J.,concurring) ("I therefore am unwilling to join the
plurality in concluding that, no matter what the circumstances, neither due process
principles nor our supervisory power could support a bar to conviction in any case where
the Government is able to prove predisposition."); id.at 495 n.6 ("I recognize that, if
limitations on police involvement are appropriate in particular situations, defining such
limits will be difficult. But these difficulties do not themselves justify the plurality's
absolute rule.").
102. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 84, § 19.02(d).
103. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.6.
104. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 84, § 19.03.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Hampton,425 U.S. at 495.
108. Id.
109.

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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cases, sets the bar at a high, high mark.
Justice Powell cited the Court's decision in Rochin v. California. In
Rochin, police forced an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's
stomach against his will, and this "stomach pumping" produced vomitus,
which contained two capsules of morphine. 110 The Court, in essence,
dismissed the prosecution when it held that the use of the two capsules in
evidence, having been secured in such a manner, violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 ' The Rochin Court emphasized
that they were concerned with the physical abuse by the police in
securing the evidence against Rochin. 112 The Court said: "[A]
conviction which rests upon evidence of incriminating objects obtained
from the body of the accused by physical abuse is as invalid as a
rests upon a verbal confession extracted from him by
conviction which
'
such abuse." 13
In our hypothetical, the Court might ignore the fact that the
outrageous conduct in the hypothetical is not physical abuse of the
defendant, and the Court might uphold a due process dismissal of the
§ 1001 prosecution based on the philosophy of Rochin. But the conduct
in the hypothetical does not rise to the level of physical abuse, and the
Court might refuse to dismiss the § 1001 prosecution against the
President based on this statement in Rochin. If so, there are still other
decisions of the Court that provide precedent for a dismissal on
constitutional grounds.
If a statute makes "a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable
conduct a violation of federal law," '"1 4 the statute can be attacked as
In United
unconstitutional as applied to that particular set of facts.'
States v. Wells, the Court, in noting the "improbability that Congress
intended to impose substantial criminal penalties on relatively trivial or
110. Id. at 166.
111. Id. at168-69.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 167.
114. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 498 (1997).
Respondents next urge that we follow the reasoning of some Courts of Appeals
in reading materiality into the statute to avoid the improbability that Congress
intended to impose substantial criminal penalties on relatively trivial or
innocent conduct .... But we think there is no clear call to take such a course.
It is true that we have held § 1014 inapplicable to depositing false checks at a
bank, in part because we thought that it would have "made a surprisingly broad
range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law". .. and elsewhere
thought it possible to construe a prohibition narrowly where a loose mens rea
requirement would otherwise have resulted in a surprisingly broad statutory
sweep.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,
71-72 (1994).
115. Wells, 519 U.S. at 498.
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innocent conduct,"'"1 6 cited two cases, United States v. Williams" 7 and
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 118 where it struck down
prosecutions that attempted to criminalize unremarkable conduct." 9 In
Williams, a defendant was charged under another false statement statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1014, with making a false statement by depositing in a
federally insured bank several checks that were not supported by
sufficient funds. 2 ° The Court construed § 1014 and found that it did not
apply to Williams's conduct because such would "render a wide range of
conduct violative of federal law ... [and] we believe that a narrow
interpretation of § 1014 would be consistent with our usual approach to
the construction of criminal statutes."121
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., the defendant was
charged with distributing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.122 In upholding the reversal of the conviction,
the Court was concerned that finding the defendant guilty of violating the
statute under the weak mens rea facts would be unconstitutional because
such a construction
would "criminalize a broad range of apparently
' 23
innocent conduct."'
Although there is no suggestion that law enforcement has yet to
engage in the conduct suggested by the hypothetical, there is no reason to
assume that if the Court were faced with the facts of the hypothetical, it
would not strike down that prosecution. In so doing, the Court would
find § 1001 to be unconstitutionally over-broad as applied to the suspect
in our hypothetical.
But if a court did not terminate the prosecution set forth in our
hypothetical under the authority of Wells, Williams, and X-Citement
Video, it could under the Eighth Amendment. In this regard, the Court in
Solem v. Helm, 24 stated that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment bars not only punishments that are
barbaric, but also those that are excessive or "disproportionate to the
crime committed.' 25 In Helm, the defendant had received a life sentence
without the possibility of parole for uttering a worthless check. 26 Helm
received this sentence because he was subject to South Dakota's
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
458 U.S. 279 (1982).
513 U.S. 64 (1994).
Wells, 519 U.S. at 498.
Williams, 458 U.S. at 280-81.
Id. at 290.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 66-67.
Id. at 68.
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 277.
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recidivist statute, and he was sentenced accordingly. 127 The Court, in
rendering its decision, said:
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could
commit." It involved neither violence nor threat of violence to any
person. The $100 face value of Helm's ... check was not trivial, but

neither was it a large amount .... It is easy to see why128such a crime
is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses.
In reversing the sentence, the Court said:
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence to
determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective
criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for
relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more harshly
than other criminals in the State who have committed more serious
crimes. He has been treated more harshly than he would have been in
any other jurisdiction.

.

.

. We conclude that his sentence is

significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment.' 29
Similarly, our hypothetical involves a most passive and non-violent
felony, and although the imagined crime may not be characterized as
trivial by some, it is not a very "large" crime, and as such, punishing it as
a felony would offend the Eighth Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
The Court has rejected "exculpatory no." Although the 1996
"materiality" amendment appears, at first blush, to have resurrected the
defense, it has not. Lying to government investigators can impair and
pervert a legitimate government function (the investigation, detection,
and prosecution of criminal conduct), and as such can violate § 1001.
Although there is some fear that the broad scope of § 1001 allows law
enforcement to manufacture criminal conduct, they have not done so.
But should they try, as was done in the hypothetical, even a former
President may be protected, not by materiality, but by the Constitution
and the Court.

127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 303.

